Sunday, April 13, 2008

Owensville’s resounding referendum… “Get us out of MoPEP!”

After Tuesday’s election the headline of the Gasconade County Republican said “Owensville residents have spoken and their message was clear…they want different thinking in city government.”

Voters elected Sam Britton and John Kamler to the Board of Aldermen. Both are members of “Concerned Citizens” the citizens group that opposes Owensville’s MoPEP “connection.” Voters also overwhelmingly approved a non-binding referendum on the city ballot which gave the Board of Aldermen direction to seek bids and pursue selling off the city’s electric generation system with the object of finding an exit from the MoPEP contract. Residents cast a resounding 506 “yes” votes and just 68 “no” votes.

The City of Hermann elected a new mayor and two new aldermen, all of whom, I am told, are open-minded and focused on resolving their MoPEP issue. The new mayor, Larry Miskel was a seated alderman, so someone will be appointed to finish his term.

The City of Hermann is involved in litigation to resolve another city utility issue, whether a city can inflate their electric rates to subsidize other non utility city services. The details are in the Friday, January 11, 2008 post. Headline: “The Hermann Class Action Suit – Part 1 of our utility rate problem.” The deposition and discovery process has been slow going up to now but with the election changes perhaps the pace will pick up. The lawsuit challenges a long established practice by most small towns with their own utility departments. Municipally-owned utilities are exempt from regulation by the Missouri Public Service which is not only a weakness that has fostered this illegal use of utility fees but the lack of oversight and control of these small town cash cows made them a prime target for MoPEP.

Owensville candidates discuss city’s share of MoPEP debt during candidate forum

In the Wednesday, April 2, ’08, Gasconade County Republican story, “Critical vote faces Owensville residents,” Editor Dave Marner provided readers with a near-verbatim Q&A from their candidate’s forum, a debate which was dominated by the MoPEP controversy that has raged since Owensville signed their MoPEP contract. When Owensville’s citizens vote on Tuesday they will be largely voting on candidates who are defined by their attitudes either for or against the MoPEP contract and their MoPEP electric prices. The news report quoted Ward 2 candidate John Kamler’s response to a question, “Our aldermen did not know what they were signing or understanding.” Kamler continued noting the city’s attorney admitted publicly to having only read every other page of the “Restated and Amended” 2005 MoPEP (Missouri Public Energy Pool) contract since the facsimile copy he [the lawyer] received was not copied on both sides of the page.” (A moment of silence while we all absorb the magnitude of the culpability revealed in that statement.)

On the Owensville ballot there will also be a rather confusing straw poll to test citizen’s will as to whether they want their new city council to start the process of getting them out of the MoPEP contract so they can do business with a private electric company that, unlike MoPEP, is regulated by the Missouri Public Service Commission.

In the article, Marner pointed out that in the 2007 Owensville annual audit the audit firm of Verkamp and Malone, CPA, Rolla, revealed to the city that Owensville’s “pro-rata share of the above (MoPEP) liabilities at Dec. 31. 2006 was $994,977.” At the time the auditors made that calculation of the city’s MoPEP liability, MJMEUC/MoPEP had only sold revenue bonds to buy shares in the first four power plants. MJMEUC has since invested in a total of 7 and perhaps 9 plants so Owensville’s pro-rated share now would be at least double the 2006 amount. Marner’s article added that, “This was the first year the city’s independent audit actually acknowledged this debt existed. Debt, by the way, which was “not included in the financial statements presented.” Members of the Concerned Citizens of Owensville group are credited with pointing that issue out to the auditors.”

More citizens in towns with MoPEP contracts need to be asking our city auditors to find out what our liability exposure is.


Monday, April 7, 2008

What is that eerie glow?

It may not mean she’s glad to see you it may mean she’s been living in the “stack shadow” of a coal-fired plant. Just when the news couldn’t get any worse for the “clean coal” boys there’s a story in the Scientific American by Mara Hvistendahl about research done in 1978 In a 1978 paper for Science, J. P. McBride at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) and his colleagues looked at the uranium and thorium content of fly ash from coal-fired power plants in Tennessee and Alabama. Coal contains uranium and thorium which are both radioactive elements. They are trace amounts and in their natural state are not a problem but when burned into “fly ash” the uranium and thorium are concentrated at up to 10 times their original levels. For the story….

Thursday, March 27, 2008

Who is killing off the coal-fired plants?

We’ve found that the cancellation of the AECI plant in Norborne near Kansas City announced the first week in February is only one of many. In a hot-off-the-press report titled "The Risks of Participating in the AMPGS Coal Plant" - February 13, 2008, by David Schlissel of Synapse Energy Economics, Schlissel found that since late 2006, more than 20 plants have been cancelled! Synapse was commissioned by the Natural Resources Defense Council to assess the risks of the American Municipal Power Ohio’s (AMP-Ohio) proposed 960 MW coal-fired power plant in Meigs County, Ohio. The picture that emerged in the report is a grim one for investors in coal-fired power. The report said, “Since late 2006, more than twenty proposed coal-fired plants have been canceled. More than three dozen others have been delayed. State regulatory commissions in Oregon, Florida, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Washington State have rejected proposed power plants. The Secretary of Health and Environment of the State of Kansas has rejected permits for two 700 MW coal-fired power plants.”

Is it the environmental costs? The Midwest has the largest concentration of old, dirty coal-fired power plants in the nation. Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Ohio and Wisconsin account for one fifth of the carbon dioxide emissions in the United States, helping to give the Midwest the dubious distinction of being responsible for more global warming pollution than any single nation on the planet other than China, India, Japan and the former Soviet Union. Energy companies have been working frantically to build even more “old technology” coal plants throughout the Midwest. In 1977, when Congress amended the Clean Air Act in 1977, it "grandfathered-in" older power plants exempting them from compliance. They figured the older facilities would be closing down soon and the new regs would apply to the new plants that replaced them. The bureaucrats underestimated the capitalists. The companies kept their old smokers flying under the 1977 exemption with partial “renovations” of the “old” plants. At present, 65 percent of the coal-burning power plants operating in the United States were built before Jimmy Carter took office.

This is why the June 11, 2007 decision by the U.S. Supreme Court on the 1977 Clean Air Act, the AEP $4.6 BILLION settlement and the public’s abrupt change of opinion about Global Warming was a mega billion dollar shock to the Big Power Boys who thought they could slick their way out of compliance forever by telling the public they had only two choices, live with filthy air or freeze. Recently the public has decided they want more choices and somebody better start coming up with them fast.

In a last roll of the dice to find a technological miracle to solve their CO2 emissions problem, the highly touted new emissions technology to produce “clean” coal-fired plants (they’re still telling bald-faced lies about “clean coal” in industry TV commercials and web sites) fell through when the Bush Administration pulled the plug on the “FutureGen” project. FutureGen was a $1.5 billion demonstration plant that was to be built in Mattoon, Illinois. After two terms of assiduously ignoring our environmental and energy dependence problems, FutureGen was a last-minute, legacy-salvaging attempt by the Bush Administration to build and operate a “clean” coal-fired plant. It was supposed to incorporate a ground-breaking new method of storing greenhouse gases underground thus making the still “dirty” emissions “clean” because the dirty stuff would be tucked out of sight and out of mind underground. The problem with underground sequestration of emissions is that it was just a shoot-from-the-hip idea by some wistful optimist but no one actually knew how to do it or whether it would work. Energy Secretary Samuel P. Bodman cited mounting cost estimates and other possible technologies as the reason for backing out of the project. Uh huh.

Under the circumstances you could be forgiven for thinking it was pollution mitigation costs that are killing coal-fired plants but surprisingly they are being killed by something much less exotic. They are toppling like dominoes not because of corporate sensitivity to clean air concerns but because of the surprisingly rapid acceleration of the cost of building coal plants. What has done them in is their corporate lust for globalism. The benefits of globalism have come back to bite them in their collective fat asses; China and India are eating up their construction resources!

Contractors are not willing to give customers a fixed price for a project when the volatile costs for alloy pipe, steel, copper, concrete as well as a tight construction labor market keep pushing prices up. China and India are competing in the construction of these plants which has caused the capital costs for new generation to climb by more than 50% in the past three years, with a more than 70% of this increase resulting from engineering, procurement and construction (EPC) costs. As the president of the Siemens Power Generation Group told the New York Times, “There’s real sticker shock out there.” This is why we’re seeing articles such as “Wall Street Shows Skepticism Over Coal” and the three leading banks, “Citigroup Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. and the bad boys at Morgan Stanley all backing away from financing coal-fired projects because they no longer consider so-called “clean” coal to be a good investment.

The AMP plant in Meigs Ohio, subject of the Synapse report, “The Risks of Participating in the AMPGS Coal Plant,” had been given the green light by the engineering firm R.W. Beck, (a firm often used by Missouri utilities) but the Synapse report found that R.W. Beck had seriously under-priced the construction costs. Costs of the plant had skyrocketing from $1.2 billion in October 2005 to nearly $3.4 billion (with financing costs) – an increase of more than 180% – in less than 30 months! NRDC staff attorney Shannon Fisk was quoted in the Kansas City "infoZine" as saying “$3.3 billion never looked this bad. For that kind of price tag, AMP should be offering cutting edge technology. Instead, all they are giving you is a dirty plant running on outdated technology. They can do far better before tapping into ratepayers’ wallets for the next 50 years.” The article quoted AMP officials who “conceded they will be unlikely to secure a fixed price construction contract. This means that as construction prices continue to grow, the cost escalations will be absorbed by municipalities and ratepayers.” AMP officials didn’t blink at the idea that they would be squeezing municipalities and ratepayers to pay for escalating and unlimited costs. What awful news for the Ohio municipalities who seem to have walked blindly into this power financing scheme for the AMP plant that sounds like a twin of MoPEP. Both will result in killer utility rates because of bad business planning and uncontrolled costs.

Just when you think it can’t get worse, last week Forbes magazine reported that coal prices will likely double by 2009! The Wall Street Journal this week reported that some coal futures on the New York Mercantile exchange have doubled since 2007 and Chinese demand is likely to push prices by up to 40 percent in the coming months. AMP has acknowledged that they will likely use an eastern blend of coal to fuel the plant. Much of this coal would come from Central Appalachia, where coal is often ‘mined’ by blasting the top off mountains.

While the real world of banking and finance is retreating at top speed from coal-fired plants and while the cost of the plants are accelerating out of all reason, Duncan Kincheloe and his MJMEUC/MoPEP boys are out buying up more stock in more coal-fired power plants that are rapidly becoming the buggy whip factories of the power world. When are the MoPEP municipalities, who by their laziness and gullibility got their citizens and utility ratepayers into this monumental open-ended mess, going to get off their fat elected asses and demand a public accounting from Kincheloe of what the additional costs are expected to be involved in building the five or six plants MJMEUC has invested in? Do they have fixed price contracts or not? Even if they do, what are the chances that the contractor will stick to the prices if it means he has to swallow huge price increases for materials? Kincheloe has been getting regular reports on this subject. Who is he sharing this information with, his MoPEP Committee lap dogs, the cities that signed his contracts or no one?

With the lies that have already been told by MJMEUC’s board and management about the ‘benefits’ of their investment scheme, and the skimpy, and/or non-existent examination by the various municipal auditors, the only objective answers we are likely to get will come from the State Auditors office. It’s time State Auditor Susan Montee started paying attention to the carnage that’s ripening right under her nose. This is not going to go away so it’s either cut off MJMEUC’s run-away debt machine now at the $1.2 billion mark or she and the next Governor and the Secretary of State may be up to their hip boots in bankrupt small communities.

Tuesday, March 25, 2008

How do you start an audit petition?

Time out for an audit petition tutorial. If you live in a MoPEP town and have figured out that your inflated electric rates are due to the MoPEP contract your non-reading city council members signed a few years ago, and if your local officials are too chicken or too hostile to do anything about the MoPEP trap they’ve gotten you into, go to the Missouri State Auditor's web site. It’s all there. Your petition wording must state the estimated amount of the cost of the audit that the city will have to pay. The state auditor’s office will give you all that. First call your county clerk and ask how many people in your city voted in the last governor’s election. The required number of signatures for a petition audit of a political subdivision the size of the City of Rolla is ten percent of the number of votes cast for the office of Governor in the most recent general election with a minimum requirement of 750. To give you an idea, The City of Rolla had 6,678 votes cast in the last gubernatorial election. The petitioners got a total of 1,006 signatures “of registered resident voters” just to make sure they had plenty and 752 were verified by the County Clerk. The city of Marceline needs 200 signatures. The “sliding scale” formula for this calculation is on the auditor’s web site and it’s very confusing. Just call the auditor’s phone number below and they will figure it out for you and they will provide you with a petition form with the correct legal language so you won’t make any mistakes in wording. Then just print out your petitions and get going. Be ready with a statement or printed press release to explain what you’re doing and why and also be prepared for an angry backlash from City Hall. Typically, any government just detests being audited by an auditor they aren’t paying and can’t control and in this case they will get hysterical because they have a very guilty conscience. Even they have probably figured out by now there’s something really wrong with that MoPEP contract they were too lazy to read. They don’t want to stir their stumps to do anything about it but they also don’t want their carelessness spread out for the whole town to see in a state audit. Most people are doing petitions to have the city audited but Farmington did an audit petition and a petition to recall their mayor at the same time. The people in Farmington were really, really mad and wanted their politicians to know just how mad they were.

To find out about the petition process, contact the State Auditor's Office at:

P. O. Box 869
Jefferson City, MO 65102

Phone: (573) 751-4213
Toll Free: 1-800-347-8597or moaudit@.auditor.mo.gov

If you have any problems e-mail me or you can go to the link RMU4YOU link on the right and thorough their web site contact either Tracey or Donna. They just successfully completed the Rolla petition drive and they can give you good advice on how to do it.

We wonder when State Auditor Susan Montee will begin to get the point. Her staff is increasingly being tied up with petition demands for city audits only because of MoPEP. Wouldn’t it be more cost-effective for her to just audit the MoPEP vulture in his nest instead of watching while he picks off the bunnies one-by-one?


Marceline, Missouri citizens start a petition drive for a state audit!

Marceline Missouri (pop. 2,558 - Linn County) is not a MoPEP member city. The city has contracted to buy electricity, not from MoPEP’s “bundled” power, but only from the Prairie State Energy Campus power when and if it starts producing power. The week of March 9th, Marceline citizens kicked off their petition for the State Auditor to audit the City of Marceline. They need 200 signatures and already have 100. Their current electrical base rate for a four tier system is: base rate $12.00; first 500 kWh-$ 0.1230; next 1000 kWh-$ 0.0730; over 1500 kWh-$ 0.0660. Marceline citizens are already having rate shock even before they start paying for the power they’ve contracted to buy from the unfinished Prairie State power plant under their new “Amended and Restated Unit Power Purchase Agreement.” The Unit Power Purchase Agreements are a different (but not better) kind of MUMEUC deal from the “Amended and Restated Missouri Public Energy Pool #1 Agreement among Missouri Joint Municipal Electric Utility Commission and Pool Members” a.k.a., the MoPEP contract. For some of the differences between the two types of contracts go back to the Feb. 20, 2008 post: “The Amended and Restated Unit Power Purchase Agreement”- MoPEP’s Ugly Sister.” We’ll keep you posted on Marceline’s petition progress.

Sunday, March 23, 2008

The “Great Diesel Generator Scheme” – Darwin Award or a mass lapse in judgment?

The “Great Diesel Generator Scheme” appeared sometime pre 2000 when Kincheloe figured out that buying power from the big commercial wholesale power producers, such as Ameren UE, KCP&L and others, and buying power on the spot market (a mugs game) then adding his markup and passing it on to the 20-some towns then in his MoPEP pool so they could add their markup to all the other markups just wasn’t working very well. In the shark tank of Big Power, Kincheloe was a guppy - he was way outclassed. Being the middleman’s middleman wasn’t a recipe for growth and it wouldn’t get him any closer to the uber-millions in assets and revenues he needed to become a member of the Club for Big Power Guys. All this marking up also wasn’t giving his MoPEP members the cheap power through the “economies of scale” he had promised to get them to join his MoPEP club. His reputation among his utility linemen as the “Wizard of Power” was beginning to suffer. To cut out some of the middlemen he had to become a producer of power not just a bundler.

His business plan was to turn his MoPEP member towns into a statewide "generator farm" by using diesel generators, linked-up via the SCADA computer system chugging away in each member town making juice for him to sell at a profit…well at least that was the plan. The fact that diesel generators are noisy, emit smelly carcinogenic fumes and diesel fuel costs about the same as gasoline seemed to bother no one. The MoPEP utility guys never see any of the holes in his business plans because the MoPEP “Pool Members” have little or no business experience. (No Virginia, running a municipal monopoly that overcharges captive customers is not running a business.)

(Note: The MoPEP contract Kincheloe issued back in the 1990’s to implement the diesel generator farm system would, in 2005, become the “Amended and Restated…” MoPEP contract. That’s the one that today controls all the MoPEP members who overcharge their customers to pay for his revenue bond investments in coal-fired power plants. That’s why the new contract was “Amended and Restated…” The cities were told the “Amended and Restated” contract was “just a few routine amendments to the old contract.”)

Kincheloe told them they could become independent of the big power producers by becoming part of his “generator farm” which would work because of “economies of scale.” Someday, he told them, they would laugh all the way to the bank at the big guys because they would be producing their own power and selling it to each other and selling it to non MoPEP members at a big retail markup. Hot Diggity Dog, that was the ticket - everyone wanted to get in on this one no matter what that “scale” thing was all about. Apparently no one questioned why there were no studies and no detailed cost analysis of this generator scheme by impartial experts. No one asked - if this was such a super idea – why wasn’t everyone doing it? All the MoPEP-ers were told was that this would work because of “economies of scale.” They had no idea what that meant but it sounded good. Each MoPEP-er was sent home to get authorization from his city government (but not from the voters) to issue millions in revenue bonds to buy some diesel generators.

All these revenue bonds would be processed through MAMU, the Missouri Association of Municipal Utilities, a non-profit 501 (c) (6) affiliate of MJMEUC. MAMU is their lobbying arm and it also offers its members "financing services.” MAMU actually hands over the processing and sale of each member’s revenue bonds to the Missouri Development Finance Board (MDFB) the state’s bond agency but first MAMU takes a “taste” as their commission for mailing the paperwork on to the MDFB. Their brochure puts it this way, “MAMU sponsors the debt through the MDFB.” They take a commission to sponsor your debt? That’s cute.

At first glance the diesel generator farm scheme, either by design or by accident, appears to be a modified Ponzi scheme but it’s more complicated than anything Italian immigrant Charles Ponzi came up with in 1903 so we’d have to call it a “Super Ponzi” or Kincheloe’s “Great Diesel Generator Scheme.” Today's Ponzi Schemes are often considerably more sophisticated than Ponzi's original, although the underlying formula is the same. The principle behind every Ponzi scheme is to exploit lapses in judgment arising from investor naïveté. Naïveté and lapses in judgment are things MoPEP towns have in abundance.

How it works….or doesn’t. As far as we can tell from the MoPEP contract, Rolla’s utility financial statements, and news reports from other member cities, after Kincheloe’s MoPEP members had invested millions in revenue bond debt to get their diesel generators and after they started generating power to sell to MoPEP*, they were ‘paid,’ with MoPEP “credits” for the diesel power they manufactured to “sell” to MoPEP. In the 2005 MoPEP contract Art. IV, 4.1 (b) says, “MoPEP #1’s compensation to each Pool Member for usability and use of its resources will be in the form of a billing credit against the Pool Members bill from MJMEUC.” This “credit” is a note that says “MoPEP owes you $X.00.” That’s the first Ponzi. But a ‘credit’ of any kind is only good if you can redeem it at will and if the credit has a well-defined value which is agreed-upon by all parties to the contract. MoPEP credits do not fit this definition. Where the rest of us use standardized paper called “money,” MoPEP uses “credits” that have a whimsical value system as determined from time to time by the MoPEP Pool Committee (4.1(a)) “based on market price and other market factors.” The contract does not specify – as it should - how ‘value’ is determined or to which market indicator the value will be pegged so that the value of each credit and its transaction can be verified and reconciled by audit at any later time. However – and here’s the catch - if Director Kincheloe and the MJMEUC board doesn’t like the prices or rates the MoPEP Pool Committee has established, the board members of MJMEUC and the managing director (Kincheloe) have the power to override the decision of the MoPEP committee and change the price (4.3 last sentence). So the illusion that the MoPEP “Pool Committee” members are representing anyone or deciding anything is clearly a sham and a facade for the real power – Director Kincheloe and his hand-picked MJMEUC board. That’s a Super Ponzi. *(Some of MoPEP’s re-bundled power is sold to non-member clients both in and out of state – Memphis Tennessee is one non-member client.)

If this weren’t such a tragedy for so many people who struggle to pay their artificially inflated MoPEP electric bills and who are threatened with being forced to pay even more expensive utility bills, it would just be a funny story about foolish people…but it isn’t. So…Kincheloe has now saddled his home boys with huge revenue bond debts or lease/purchase debts to MAMU for “sponsored debt,” to pay off their diesel generator debt but they can’t pay off their revenue bond debts out of their diesel generator “revenue” because their only “revenue” from the generators is in MoPEP IOU’s which are being used to pay their MoPEP electric bills and which are worthless for making bond payments anyway. Bond holders don’t take homemade ‘money’ or Kincheloe’s MoPEP “credits” as payment. But if the revenue from the generators is being used to apply against the members MoPEP bills as the contract says, then the cities with generator bond payments must be paying their bond debts out of the general fund which they aren’t supposed to do. Oh well, what’s one constitutional violation among fifty.

This is the Darwin Award part. Meanwhile, the MoPEP-ers are paying cash to buy tanker trucks full of expensive diesel fuel which they pour into their expensive generators to generate expensive electricity which they ‘sell’ to MoPEP (that’s themselves). The MoPEP Pool Committee (that’s them too) then decides (or think they are deciding) how much the ‘credits’ are worth that they’ve earned from making diesel power. The contract (4.1(a)) says this is “based on market price and other market factors” whatever that means but it doesn’t say it’s based on the true cost of producing a ‘credit.’ After the value of one of these credits is determined by the Pool Committee, then they also decide the amount of each Pool Members “Assessment” (4.3) that’s the rate established by the Pool Committee (that’s them again) of the value of MoPEP’s Services to Pool Members (themselves) which “shall include recovery of MJMEUC’s direct costs to acquire, provide and deliver Services.” (You remember the “direct costs” don’t you, the costs that can include a million dollar new office building, an “inspection” trip to China, or whatever else “without limitation?) By the time all Kincheloe’s “Services” are deducted from the value of the diesel ‘credit’ they produced with their little gas cans full of expensive diesel fuel there isn’t much left of the ‘credit’ to apply to the members huge MoPEP power bills. In the case where MoPEP credits are being accumulated, (if such a thing is ever allowed to happen) any 100 credits might have 10 or more different values depending on which time period and what “other market factors” were used to determine their value. Now everyone who believes that the utility guys who are supposed to be doing all these calculations are really doing them stand on your head and honk like a goose.

This process is so boneheaded and open for manipulation it’s almost beyond belief that anyone would fall for it much less that over 30 towns - all with access to legal counsel - would walk into it without reading it, but it gets worse. It is unlikely that any of the utility managers know how to keep track of their real costs per kilowatt which should be the base number in the formula to calculate the value of one diesel kilowatt. Having established the cost of one diesel kilowatt then they would determine whether one or 10 or 100 kilowatts become one MoPEP ‘credit.’ It is also unlikely that any of the differential costs between the cities or the variables between the individual generators in the same town are being reconciled to arrive at a fair base for all these calculations. The contract doesn’t say…no one can say.

Here’s the grand finale or the Grand Folly. The diesel-generated power they sold to MoPEP (to themselves) for devalued ‘credits’ (for “devalued credits” read “cheap”), Kincheloe mixes with his other power purchases; then he marks it all up and sells it right back to these Darwin Award winners who produced and sold to him the diesel part of the power that they’re buying back with his markup added into the price! It makes your brain hurt doesn’t it? Kincheloe is actually selling back to the MoPEP cities - for cash - the same power those cities manufactured but were paid for in devalued MoPEP ‘credits!’

After they fed their own cash into the generators to get the process started and deducted the cost of MoPEP’s “Services” was there any “added value” at the end when they applied their credits against their electric bills? Would it have been more cost effective not to have the generators at all and just use cash to pay the MoPEP electric bill instead of going through this elaborate conversion of bond debt to diesel fuel to kilowatts to manipulated MoPEP accounting to….? These are questions an independent expert would have provided to tell the MoPEP members whether the scheme was sound or not before they were locked into it. Did they hire one or were they told it wasn’t necessary?

The bottom line here is that Kincheloe is getting virtually free power from all the MoPEP diesel generators and selling it back to his patsy’s. But despite being subsidized by MoPEP communities with free or nearly free diesel power - he still can’t deliver the cheaper power product he promised them with his “economies of scale” propaganda. Proof of this is that MoPEP’s wholesale price of 6.53¢ per kilowatt is nearly the same as the retail price (average s/w rates) of about 6.7¢ per kilowatt charged by commercial producers to their direct residential customers! After each MoPEP town adds their local 3¢ to 5¢ markup on top of MoPEP’s 6.53¢ “wholesale” rate you can see why MoPEP towns have local electric rates of from 9.3¢ in Rolla up to 11¢ and 12¢ per kWh in other unfortunate MoPEP towns.

MoPEP credits then are IOU’s or a form of private MoPEP currency with poorly calculated costs, inflated administrative charges against the credits and a floating value which can be set or changed at the convenience of MJMEUC. No legitimate business is done with such sloppy methods. The MoPEP members who are the holders of this “sterile” MoPEP “money” or MoPEP IOU’s, cannot put them in a bank to earn interest and they can’t use them to purchase supplies or make payroll and they can’t sell them to anyone else. They can only spend their MoPEP credits in the MoPEP company store for goods priced by the company and they can only spend their ‘credits’ when the company decides the store is open for business!

Obviously the MoPEP diesel-kilowatts-for-credits scheme needs a top to bottom investigation. How this system works is not explained in either the auditors “Notes” of each city’s private audits nor are they explained in the audits of MAMU or MJMEUC. In fact, MoPEP “credits” are not mentioned in any audits at all. How strange, all those millions payable and receivable in this kilowatts-for-credits scheme and there is no mention of it in any of the audits on either end. As far as we know no private city auditor has investigated the diesel-kilowatts-for-credits arrangement and assured their municipal clients that Kincheloe’s “Great Diesel Generator Scheme” is legitimate or if his clients are losing their shirts. Whichever, this business scheme of Kincheloe’s didn’t work either that’s why his next business plan was his most ambitions so far…using his MoPEP members as guarantors to issue over a BILLION dollars in revenue bonds to buy into a dying industry - coal-fired power plants.