Dumb, Dumber and Alderman Penning

I’ve often said that MJMEUC’s MoPEP and UPPA contracts are I.Q. tests for city elected officials…when they sign; they flunk, but perhaps even that was too kind. This is a true story about Hermann, Missouri, another MoPEP town, and their city council discussion of the class-action lawsuit against them for allegedly skimming their inflated utility prices which could cost them as much as $5,255,000 in rebates alone.  The city of course denies that they ever deliberately inflated utility rates so they could skim off the excess revenues for non utility uses even though this ‘accident’ happened with uncanny regularity month after month, year after year, decade after decade.

On September 27, 2010, the Hermann City Council was listening to a report from City Attorney Politte on the progress of the lawsuit which had just been transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court. It’s a total mystery why Mayor Miskel allowed them to discuss this in open session as “new business” when a report on the status of active ongoing litigation not only isn’t “new” business it’s one of the few topics that they can legitimately discuss in closed session.   Oh well….

Nevertheless, the discussion was held in open session where CountyNewsLIVE.com publisher Jeff Noedel could capture this priceless record of the meeting where the collective pants of Hermann’s city government were pulled down around their ankles. In just seconds and in one very long run-on sentence, City Alderman Penning dropped the city’s legal defense into the toilet. It was possibly the most painful, if not the most expensive bombing run on a city since World War II.

This makes Alderman Penning a candidate for the 2010 MoPEP Darwin Awards, not because he blurted out the awful truth in front of witnesses and killed their key legal defense, but because Penning really believes that a local vote in Hermann can supersede a statewide voter referendum to amend the state constitution.

Read the short transcript below and after you quit laughing – or, if you live in Hermann, after you quit crying - see if you don’t agree that there is dumb, dumber and then there is Alderman Penning. 

PERILOUS "ARBOR LAWSUIT" DISCUSSED IN CITY MEETING MONDAY NIGHT: City lawyers consider case's transfer to Supreme Court "positive development" -- Ald. Penning says electric department was set-up in 1950s "to make money to run the city"

CountyNewsLIVE.com Mon, 09/27/2010 - 11:20pm — J. Noedel-Publisher

Monday night was the first Board of Aldermen meeting since the "Arbor lawsuit" against the city was transferred to the Missouri Supreme Court.  Hermann Mayor Larry Miskel asked City Attorney Dave Politte to offer a report.

Here is a transcript of what was said by Politte and by Hermann Aldermen Dan Wilson and John Penning:
(23:23)  MAYOR LARRY MISKEL:  Next on the agenda under new business is the status of the of the Arbor-Hancock lawsuit...the Arbor lawsuit. (inaudible)  You're up.

CITY ATTORNEY DAVE POLITTE:  Just...It won't take long.  I just want to report that the Supreme Court of Missouri has accepted transfer and will consider arguments in this case.
As you recall, our local circuit court ruled in the city's favor, without even the need for a trial, saying the city wins.
The plaintiffs took the case to the Court of Appeals of the Eastern District.  And, as you recall from Mr. Heinz's discussion, there were five factors for the Court to consider when try to determine whether our electric fees are a tax or not.  And if they decide that they are not, then that's in favor of the city.
Well a local circuit court decided in favor of the city on four-and-a-half of the five.  The Court of Appeals said, 'No, we want the circuit court judge to look at it again, because we think that three of the five are inconclusive.'  They didn't rule in favor of the other side; they just said they needed more information.
But now that the Supreme Court has going to look at it... And we, the attorneys, view that as a good thing, because they may just decide to overrule the Court of Appeals.  And in that event...

ALDERMAN DAN WILSON:  Can you speak-up just a little bit please?

POLITTE:  The Supreme Court is going to take the case, and we think that is a good thing because they may decide to overrule the Court of Appeals and to uphold the local circuit judge's decision.  In which case, the case is over.  Without the need to come back to the local circuit court and have a trial and go through the expense and hassle of all that, with the possibility of having to go back up the ladder again to the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court. So...it's, I think, a positive development.

(25:30)  WILSON:  Is it alright to discuss that there were others that are interested in this case that were not previously?  Could you go into that briefly, if it doesn't...?

POLITTE:  Well, officially, the Missouri Municipal League and the Missouri Public Utility Alliance have filed what they call amicus briefs with the court, supporting the position of the city of Hermann.  What an amicus brief is it's something that the courts allow to be filed by parties who aren't a party to the case but who have a real interest, or a real... (26:00) something at stake in the outcome, and I think those two organizations both...

WILSON:  That part is clear.  What status are these two groups....are they recognized in the state as having any kind of standing in any way?  You know, I mean, what does this do?  I mean, I'm not trying to tie you into legal...  What I'm trying to find out is... I know what the M.M.L. is, but maybe other people do not.  And...

POLITTE:  Well, the Missouri Municipal League is an association of Missouri cities or municipalities who associate in order to look out for the interests of the cities and municipalities.  And they have a lobbying arm.  They'll have individuals that go to Jeff. City trying to lobby on behalf of cities.
(27:00)  A lot of what they do, though, is education and support. They host the seminars for the city officials to go to and learn how to become aldermen and mayor.  And they hold city attorney seminars.  And they provide newsletters to city clerks and mayors and attorneys on updates on the law and so forth.  They're basically an organization formed by cities to advocate for cities.

WILSON:  And the other group?

POLITTE:  It is the same thing with respect to utilities, and municipally-owned utilities.  The Missouri Public Utility Alliance is the umbrella under which you have MDGMCK and MOPEP and the Gas Commission and the various...

WILSON:  So this means we've acquired quite a few friends in this case.

POLITTE:  We have.  And we've also made some good friends... If you want to say 'Misery loves company,' but... (27:53)  The City of Marceline has been sued by the same plaintiff's law firm under the same theory.  And the City of Salem has been sued by the same plaintiff's lawyer under the same theory.
Rumor has it that there are other cities out there that have a target on them.  But those are the only two that I know of so far.

WILSON:  What was the original date of the filing of this case...when this case started?

POLITTE:  It was on or about January first of 2008.

WILSON:  2008.  Thank you.

(28:20) ALDERMAN JOHN PENNING:  I still have a question that I have... There was a magazine that came out this week that was in our file.  Did you read the last page of it?  That covered this lawsuit?  The City of Hermann and Arbor?  Written by a lawyer in St. Louis. I don't know if he represented them or not.
What I don't understand... The Hancock Amendment was passed in 1980.  We had an election in the 50s in this town to go into the electrical business to make money to run the city.  It's never been rescinded.  And that would sure supersede the Hancock Amendment.

And that point has never been argued.

And that was a vote of the citizens of Hermann.  And I was asked if I can document that, and I said, 'Absolutely.'  Because I voted in that election.

And that was, to me, superseded any Hancock Amendment that may come up.  Because it was done specifically to make money to run the city.  And that's what the people voted in.
(pause)

MISKEL:  I believe our attorneys are well aware of that.


PENNING:  But that was never brought up, and it should have been.  It's never been changed.
(end of article)

Mo. Supreme Court to hear Hermann utilities rate case

Gasconade County Republican, Wednesday, 22 September 2010 08:30 Dave Marner 

Missouri’s Supreme Court will hear a Hermann-based lawsuit seeking relief from the city of Hermann for alleged violations of the Hancock Amendment, specifically overcharging its residents on utility fees.
Minutes from the Supreme Court’s session on Tuesday, released at 1 p.m. Sept. 21, noted the appellants’ Aug. 3 “application for transfer from the Court of Appeals, No. ED92933, (is) sustained and cause ordered transferred,” according to the court’s web site.

Jeffrey T. McPherson, an attorney for the  firm Armstrong Teasdale, LLP, in St. Louis, which represents Arbor Investment Company, LLC., CFV Plastics, LLC, and citizens Buzz Manley and Donna Austin as the plaintiffs/appellants, said Tuesday afternoon he had not received a written order from the court but confirmed he saw the notice on the court’s web site. “That’s what I heard,” said McPherson. “That’s what the notation on the (court’s) web site says. I believe its been granted.”

He said the application for transfer to the state’s Supreme Court was filed “in the general interest for the people of the state.”

The application for transfer notes the cities of Salem and Marceline, like Hermann, “have padded their general revenue by unconstitutionally increasing utility charges without a vote of the people” and cites state audit reports of those Missouri communities as a footnote. Hermann’s audit, according to the Appellate Court’s ruling of June 22, shows the gross receipts fees paid from electric, water, sewer, and natural gas utilities to the general revenue fund accounts for 35 percent of total general revenue.”

What remained unclear to the Appellate Court, however, was if this was done by design to raise general revenue funds or simply the way it worked out. The court was unable to determine if that issue favored the city or the appellants/plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeals found two factors in the city’s favor and three others which involved “genuine disputes of material fact.” It ruled the trial court “erred in entering summary judgement in favor of the city” since there were disputed facts concerning utility rates as they pertained to the Hancock Amendment approved by voters in November 1980.

“We’re asking the judgement of the Circuit Court be reversed,” said McPherson, “It’s an issue of general interest (statewide) that the court should rule on.”

In the Appellate Court’s ruling, Presiding Judge Robert G. Dowd, Jr., wrote for the 3-judge panel: “If it is shown on remand that the object of the fees is to fund the city’s general revenue, then this constitutes a violation of the Hancock Amendment and deserves an appropriate remedy under the Hancock Amendment.”

“That’s what was asked of the Supreme Court,” said McPherson. “To rule on the Hancock Amendment as it’s applied to all these political subdivisions.”
McPherson said they seek the Supreme Court’s ruling to “uphold the Appellant’s reversal and enter a judgement for the plaintiffs.” The Whole Story....

The not-so-final deal to cover Prairie State cost overruns

The September 15, 2010, Bond Buyer headline confidently declared “Final Prairie State Deal Looms” announcing that the nine municipal consortium owners – MJMEUC among them – will have to pony up another BILLION dollars to cover the cost overruns on this ill-fated coal-fired power plant. Calling this the “final deal” was just way too optimistic.

Don’t confuse this article about the additional debt necessary to cover the colossal cost overruns on the Prairie State plant which was exposed by the Chicago Tribune in July, with the Kansas City Star’s expose on September 8th, of the colossal cost overruns that will have to be covered on the Iatan 2 power plant, another of MJMEUC’s ill-advised high-risk investments.

These belated reports on the true costs of both Prairie State and Iatan 2 plants, and the accelerating cost of the megawatts both plants will eventually generate, should make for interesting discussion at the next MoPEP meeting when CEO Kincheloe and CFO Loethen try to explain to their members that finding their share of the Prairie State BILLION dollar cost overrun to add to the billions in debt they already have and doubling the cost of the power it produces is....no big deal?

MJMEUC owns 12.3% of PS and has already invested over $600 M in the project. Because they are owners the joint venture MJMEUC/MoPEP members will have to throw in about another $60 million to cover their share of the cost overruns at this stage of construction which is still less than 50% complete. There is no telling how astronomical the cost per megawatt will finally be when the last 50% of the plant is finished because from here on it’s all cost overruns!

At the next MoPEP meeting CEO Duncan Kincheloe will stumble through some admin-babble explanation to the utility managers, mayors and city administrators who are used to having smoke blown up their noses and have unquestioningly swallowed all the sunshine construction reports they have been getting for years from CEO Duncan Kincheloe and his Project Manager Vern Kincheloe. Will any of these gullible MoPEP members wonder if their MJMEUC/MoPEP investment in PS, which was supposed to produce $35 MW power, is still cost effective at $64.40 per MW?

How high does the price have to go before they realize they’ve been had - $75, $85, $100 per MW? Which of MJMEUC's other power investment gambles will be the next to report billions in cost overruns that the Kincheloe Family construction reports haven’t mentioned?

Finally someone - an IMPA official in this article - admitted what anyone with a grain of common sense (that automatically excludes everyone who voted for a MoPEP contract) knew, “For all participating agencies, the increased costs will ultimately mean higher electric rates for municipalities and other customers that buy their power from the agencies.”

The article quoted MJMEUC CFO Mike Loethen as saying MJMEUC/MoPEP plans to issue additional debt to cover its increased costs, although those numbers have not yet been finalized. “The immediate need for funds is not there yet, but we may enter the market before the end of the year to take advantage of the BAB program,” Loethen said.

The “immediate need is not there yet?” Which “immediate need” is Loethen talking about? The “immediate need” to borrow more millions to cover Prairie State cost overruns, the “immediate need” to borrow more millions to cover the Iatan 2 cost overruns or the “immediate need” to cover the cost overruns for the remainder of both the Prairie State and Iatan 2 construction?

Even leveraging the usual first lien on the utility revenues of their newest member, the City of Lebanon, and cashing the check for Lebanon's join-up fee of $550,000 won’t begin to cover the ante-up on these plants and even if it did there are all those lawsuits. There is the one by Kennett and Poplar Bluff against MJMEUC because Duncan allegedly stole their Plum Point transmission rights and gave them away to other members - that one may cost MJMEUC millions. Then there are the class action Hancock lawsuits against Hermann, Marceline and Salem that MJMEUC/MoPEP members haven’t been told about. If successful those will permanently cripple MJMEUC’s ability to squeeze unlimited rate increases out of their obtuse MoPEP captives. The bond rating agencies aren’t going to like that one at all.

MJMEUC's upside down pyramid of debt that teeters precariously on top of 35 little rural Missouri towns just gets bigger….and bigger….and bigger….

The Bond Buyer – Final Prairie State Deal Looms
Agencies Gear Up For Coal Plant Sale

By Caitlin Devitt and Yvette Shields Wednesday, September 15, 2010

CHICAGO — Public power agencies in Indiana and Ohio plan to return to the market this month with their final borrowings for the Prairie State coal-fired plant project that has risen in cost by more than $1 billion to $4.4 billion.

The nine power agencies that own a stake in the Prairie State Energy Campus will need to come up with more than $1 billion to cover rising construction costs associated with the project, one of the only new coal plants being built in the U.S. more…

Iatan 2 - Another MJMEUC/MoPEP investment with double cost overruns

The Kansas City Star reported on September 8, 2010, that another MJMEUC investment, Iatan 2, in Weston Kansas, has joined the now infamous Prairie State power plant in having doubled their construction cost estimate. These unpleasant and newly disclosed facts about the billions in Prairie State and Iatan 2 cost overruns have not been reported in MoPEP meetings by Vern Kincheloe, MJMWUC/MoPEP CEO Duncan Kincheloe’s relative, who for years has been in charge of construction oversight of their power plant investments.

If Kincheloe and the MJMEUC/MoPEP board won’t tell their MoPEP “joint venture” members the truth about incompetence in the construction and management of the over $2 Billion in power plant investments MJMEUC has made behind the backs of their member cities who are locked into this “joint venture,” the MoPEP cities will have to subscribe to the major metro newspapers to keep up with this grim tale about their escalating liability.

Since the Chicago Tribune broke the story about the bloated costs of the Prairie State power plant in Illinois, other metro papers have ceased their uncritical praise for these projects for the few jobs they will produce and are beginning to dig out the rest of the story - the one all electric consumers are going to have to pay for.

Who will wind up paying for all these bloated plants? The only answer is - the investors in the plant which includes the MJMEUC/MoPEP "joint venture" investors. That’s what “joint venture” means, all partners in the venture are equally liable for EVERYTHING that goes wrong. That’s why the MJMEUC/MoPEP contracts contain a blanket requirement that all MoPEP members pay without question and without exception for any and all of MoPEP’s “direct costs” that are passed through to them along with their power bills.

MoPEP Mayors will try to deny their local electric rates will be impacted by these cost overruns but that’s patently false. Investors and consumers always pay and the MoPEP towns are equity investors – owners – of these plants, they have not just contracted to buy overpriced power from them. The MW price for Prairie State power was $35 MW but it's now quoted at $64.40 per MW and it will go higher because that plant is less than 50% complete. One way or another they will pass these mismanagement costs down the kilowatt billing pipeline even if they have to sell MW at a loss to others with investor-client municipalities and their captive ratepayers making up the losses.

But, if you look down the road – something the city council signatories of the deceptive MoPEP contracts didn’t attempt to do - there are some unavoidable market forces at work here that will eventually kill the MoPEP scam no matter how loyal the municipal Bubba’s are to Kincheloe’s club. As these vastly overpriced plants go on line, MJMEUC and the other municipalities in Midwest states that were foolish enough to become equity investors to finance these plants and also consumers of their overpriced power, will try to absorb the cost overruns but they can’t eat them all by passing along the bloat to non-owner customers because they’ll price themselves out of the market. Charging a .15¢ per kWh rate when 10 miles away a smarter town is buying direct from a cheaper PSC rate-regulated commercial utility and paying less than 7¢, is no way to run a shoe store.

How long can the MoPEP towns charge double the commercial kWh rates to their local customers and not run all business and most residential customers out of town either to nearby towns that were smart enough not to join MoPEP or to unincorporated areas where they can get cheaper co-op rates? Long term, Duncan Kincheloe’s “joint venture” investment club not only won’t “stabilize” your rates as Kincheloe and his minions claim but they will strangle the delicate economic balance of dozens of Midwest small towns until they are boarded up ghost towns. You could call that “stabilized.”

KCP&L faulted for mismanagement in power plant project
By STEVE EVERLY
The Kansas City Star (Posted Wed, Sep. 08, 2010 11:41 PM)

The Iatan 2 power plant near Weston (in this 2009 photo) has taken more than four years to build and is scheduled to begin operation later this year. The plant is now estimated to cost almost $2 billion — about double original estimates.
Kansas City Power & Light mismanaged much of the early construction of its new coal-fired power plant near Weston, causing cost overruns that it wants its customers to cover, according to a report to Kansas regulators.

The utility ignored expert advice, delayed important decisions and had a “dysfunctional” relationship with the contractors on the Iatan 2 project, according to Walter Drabinski, president of Vantage Consulting Inc., who was retained by the staff of the Kansas Corporation Commission.
His report said those problems added costs and caused delays for the coal-fired power plant, now estimated to cost almost $2 billion — about double original estimates. More...

Chicago Tribune expose explodes myths about Prairie State coal plant

It isn’t “clean” coal, it won’t “sequester” carbon emissions, it won’t be built for $2.4 Billion and the power it produces won’t cost $35 MW - all as originally claimed. It will cost over $4.4 Billion to build which is twice as much as they claimed, and the estimate for the cost of power from Prairie State is $64.40 per MW and still rising! As of June 2010 Peabody admitted the plant is only 48% finished. See Prairie State’s own press release: Prairie State Coal Plant coming right along ...it’s just not “coming right along” very well.

More breaking news for the Prairie State true believers: There is no Tooth Fairy.

The details of the July 12, 2010, Chicago Tribune story, Clean coal dream a costly nightmare, by Tribune reporter Michael Hawthorne, had to be wrenched out with a Freedom of Information pry bar. The resulting disclosures punctured the heretofore unquestioned puffery that has been spewing out of the Prairie State public relations department since this project was first proposed in 2001. Hawthorne’s story set off a frenzy of coal-partisan counter stories and local fall-out stories in newspapers all over the Midwest from shocked Prairie State town governments that had invested in the plant. Some stories quoted embarrassed deeply-in-denial city administrators who were caught with their pants down exposing the “I ♥ Prairie State” tattoos on their gullible butts.

The Tribune missed the bigger story

The Tribune story however, focused on the financial damage the uncontrolled Prairie State costs will have on the municipalities in and around the Chicago area, i.e. Naperville, Batavia, Geneva, St. Charles and Winnetka, that were suckered into signing contracts either to invest in the plant as owners entitled to a share of the output or that contracted for the power and actually believed the PR spin that the lowballed quotes on cost of construction and cost of power was real and that every multi-million dollar cost overrun would be the last.

In order to find the financing for this environmental black elephant, Peabody had to use not just the five Illinois municipalities in the Tribune story but municipalities and municipal associations in several states in the Midwest to raise the billions necessary to finance the over-ballyhooed “clean-coal” plant. As the billions in cost overruns secretly accumulated more towns and municipal associations from Virginia, Indiana, Illinois, Ohio, Missouri, Michigan and Kentucky had to be sucked in as investors to cover runaway costs.

The mind boggles at the large numbers of impaired elected officials who bought into this scam without a blink and with no due diligence. Having voted for a Prairie State contract ought to be grounds for automatic impeachment.

Project investor/owners now include: American Municipal Power, Illinois Municipal Electric Agency, Indiana Municipal Power Agency, Kentucky Municipal Power Agency, Northern Illinois Municipal Power Agency, Peabody Energy, Prairie Power Inc. Southern Illinois Power Cooperative and Missouri Public Utility Alliance, a.k.a. MJMEUC or MoPEP.

Peabody now owns only 5% of Prairie State having sold off 95% of the liability to the above named schmucks.

By Friday, July 23, Prairie State executives were no longer answering questions or taking phone calls. Rumors could not be confirmed that the PS executives and their PR department had bunkered-up in their much publicized coal mine next to the unfinished Prairie State plant that is "coming right along" at a 50% cost overrun with only 48% completion.

The peasants are revolting...

The crap storm created by the original Tribune story had reached such velocity that to quiet the gasps of shock and outrage from city officials, who were finally beginning to suspect they had sold their towns a bill of goods by encouraging them to make direct equity investments in the mythical $35MW Prairie State pricing, panicked Prairie State officials began throwing bread over the walls to the angry peasants by promising price caps on their over-sold, under-priced product.

In a July 23, 2010 follow-up to the Tribune story, also by Hawthorne on Chicago Breaking News, Coal plant developer feels pressure, caps costs, Peter DeQuattro, chief executive officer of the Prairie State Generating Co., said, “This agreement will provide greater price stability and economic predictability, which will benefit Prairie State owners and the customers they serve. The company did not respond to questions.” That devious line about “price stability and economic predictability” in the far distant future is an over-used sales line that Prairie State officials and their minions have long fed the unsuspecting communities they’ve roped into this specious long-term investment. Prices can be 10 times a higher than that of the commercial competition and technically still be “stable and predictable!”

The Tribune story explained that only the “construction budget” will be capped. “Without providing details of the new agreement, the management company in charge of overseeing the plant said it had brokered a new deal capping the construction budget at "approximately $4 billion. That amount does not include the project's total costs, including nearby coal reserves, mine development and transmission lines. Because we don't know the details it's possible that a huge amount of the costs of the project could be shifted over to the “nearby coal reserves, mine development and transmission lines.” And who pays for the "nearby coal reserves, mine development and transmission lines?" You’ll notice that they said nothing about capping operating costs or that they wouldn't shift a variety of costs to the post construction operating charges. After all who's to know?

But Ma! They said it was "Clean" Coal!

In a similar and naturally uncritical story off the PR Newswire, Jul. 23, 2010, Prairie State and Bechtel Announce New, Fixed-Cost EPC Agreement Providing Greater Economic Stability, obligingly repeated by iStockAnalyist on the deal to cap costs of construction between Bechtel Power Corporation and Prairie State Generating Company, LLC, Prairie State President and CEO Peter DeQuattro said, “The agreement supports our mission of delivering low-cost, reliable and environmentally responsible electricity.” DeQuattro added, "This remains a good investment for our owners and the customers they serve. Equally important, the project will invest approximately $1 billion in 21st century technologies, making it among the cleanest power plants of its kind anywhere in the nation.” DeQuattro pointed out that Prairie State’s “carbon dioxide emissions will be approximately 15 percent lower than the typical U.S. coal plant.”

DeQuattro's statement is breathtaking in it's duplicity. US coal plants produce 52% of the enormous amount of electricity used in the US. Of that 52% coal plants belch out carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases that are suspected to cause climatic warming and they are also a source of sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, fly ash and mercury which are harmful to human health and may be largely responsible for acid rain.

Alex Gabbard, author of Coal Combustion: Nuclear Resource or Danger? and other scientists and engineers believe that although not as well known, fly ash and other releases from coal combustion contain naturally occurring radioactive materials--mainly, uranium and thorium and they believe that “those living near coal-fired power plants are exposed to higher radiation doses than those living near nuclear power plants that meet government regulations.”

For DeQuattro or any other advocate of “King Coal” to blandly say that this plant is among the “cleanest power plants of its kind anywhere in the nation” is a feeble accolade. When he says “Prairie State’s carbon emissions will be 15% lower than the “typical U.S. coal plant” it’s like saying sewage effluvia filtered though panty hose is 15% more drinkable than unfiltered sewage. It may have fewer lumps but it’s just as noxious and still deadly.

Why they're getting "hosed this bad”

The best quote of all in the stories was this one from Bruce Nilles, director of the Sierra Club’s national coal campaign: “We predicted four years ago that this was going to be a bad deal for ratepayers. But we never envisioned they would get hosed this bad even before Prairie State generates a watt."

In the same PR Newswire, Jul. 23, 2010 press release disguised as a real news story, DeQuattro also declared that, “construction costs of all types of power plants – whether coal, nuclear, natural gas or wind – have significantly increased since work began on the new plant. Rising commodity prices, along with labor costs and other factors, have increased the cost of new power plants by 130 percent between 2000 and 2008, according to IHS Cambridge Energy Research Associates.” That’s the first halfway correct statement we've read from him.

China is breaking ground for a new coal plant EVERY WEEK! India is ramping up to that volume and other power-starved countries in the Pacific Rim also with explosive economic growth are not far behind. For at least a decade it has been widely known that these countries, particularly China, are major importers of our raw construction materials and even import Western construction companies and engineers. In 2003 coal-fired power plants were estimated at over $2 billion and hundreds were being planned. By 2008 costs had doubled, accelerating risk made insurance impossible to obtain, smart banking money was backing off and plants in half a dozen states were being canceled. Only one dramatic event was needed to put a stake through the heart of the fossil-fuel power industry.

The stake came in the form of the June 11, 2007, U.S. Supreme Court landmark decision on the 1977 Clean Air Act in the Justice Department case against American Electric Power (AEP). The $4 Billion fine on October 2007 forcing the polluter to install anti-pollution equipment on all its plants and pay other damages downwind sealed the deal against King Coal. Wall Street bankers withdrew their financial support from power plants with such huge environmental liability and uncontrollable costs. Plants were canceled in a half dozen states as regulatory commissions woke up to the high construction costs and environmental risks. Now most coal-fired plants under construction have a $4 billion price tag and counting.

Construction costs don’t increase that much faster in a single sector than over the general economy in such a short a time unless there are targeted and uncontrollable economic factors such as China and India buying up wood, concrete, steel, mechanics and other components necessary for their mega power plants, giant dams and other construction projects. Even coal is being shipped from our Powder River to China by….oh yes… our good friends at Peabody Coal, the originators of the Prairie State power plant!

Can you break a contract on grounds of stupidity?

Now the only way “King Coal” can survive financially is to victimize small municipalities like Martinsville Virginia, Naperville Illinois and the MoPEP cities of Missouri by conning them into “investing” or bankrolling these behemoth high-risk plants with false reports on costs and soothing lies about “stabilizing” their soaring energy costs in the far distant future.

We predict that when the revealed bills for their foolishness exceeds their red faces, city officials, who pushed these investments in coal-fired power plants to their elected officials who don't like to read "all that legal stuff," will be planning lawsuits to get out of, what they were telling their citizens just recently, was the smart play of securing future pie-in-the-sky megawatts against future rising prices.

What will be their grounds to get out of a contract they willingly, even enthusiastically signed? In the first place these were equity investments i.e. stock purchases, just as if the city was investing in the stock market or buying into Joe’s Bar and Grill. Municipalities, school boards and other public entities aren’t allowed to invest public tax money in private businesses and stocks because if they were allowed to do anything so bird-brained all our public institutions would have long since been bankrupt. There is, unfortunately, never a shortage of dunderheads serving on elected boards that have a “hot tip” in the market and think it's a good idea to invest the city's reserves in it.

Second, this was an investment and the investors (even though those investors shouldn't have been investing) – that’s not just the elected officials but the citizens of those victimized communities are supposed to be given a prospectus with a full disclosure of the risks involved in the investment and a lot of other due diligence information. Does it sound like Peter DeQuattro ever disclosed the risks of Prairie State and coal-fired plants to any of these people?

Fashioning a rod for your own back

Someone from an environmental group pointed out the irony inherent in sucking these towns in as default 'bankers' for an industry that is no longer credit-worthy in the real world. Once the municipalities have been gulled –however ignorantly and illegally- into investing in these over-priced, high-risk coal plants it is simple for the coal power industry, in it's many guises, to turn them into mass lobbying shills for and are wound up and set off to lobby in full hysterical mass to oppose any state or federal legislation designed to promote alternative energy sources or reduction of coal emissions which would reduce the pollutants that are detrimental to their own health and welfare!

You’ve got to hand it to the King Coal boys. It’s not every industry that can get people who want both power and clean air to pay a premium user fee for the power and at the same time get them lobby for the privilege of choking to death on the smog belched out by the power plants which generate the outrageously priced kilowatts they're paying for to toast their muffins and dry their jockey shorts.

State audit confirms MoPEP contract is like a cigarette filter - a ‘delivery device’ for toxic liability

On May 12, 2009, State Auditor Susan Montee released the findings of special petition audit for the City of Rolla and the Rolla Municipal Utilities (RMU). Thousands of Rolla citizens had signed petitions to get the city - particularly the city’s utility department - audited by the state for a number of reasons such as rampant nepotism, but primarily because of the disastrous impact the switch to MJMEUC/MoPEP as a wholesale power supplier had on the city’s electric rates in 2006 and 2007 and continuing. State Auditor Montee, during her public presentation of the audit, described MJMEUC/MoPEP as “a shell corporation” and in the audit said the MoPEP contract “may” have made all MoPEP member cities “joint venture” partners in what is now over $2.1 BILLION in revenue bond debt to buy into more than a half dozen coal-fired power plants located in several Midwest states. For “joint venture” read “joint liability.”

All towns that have been suckered into MoPEP contracts and MJMEUC’s UPPA contracts should read the Rolla audit carefully. Everything the auditor said about Rolla’s liability as a “joint venture” partner with MJMEUC/MoPEP applies equally to all other MoPEP members and may also apply to the seven cities that signed UPPA contracts with MJMEUC.

The audit confirmed what the chief petitioners, Donna Hawley (now a member of the Rolla city council) and Tracey Watson, claimed from the beginning that the 2005 Amended MoPEP contract the Rolla city council signed without reading was not an industry-standard commodity agreement to provide cheaper electricity due to MoPEP’s claimed “economies of scale,” it was a contract contrivance or machine to feudalize small towns into a “collateral farm” so MJMEUC could, without the knowledge or consent of local officials and taxpayers, pledge the collective electric revenues of the now 33 MoPEP members to leverage a $10 million bank loan into over $2.1+ BILLION in revenue bond debt. Thus, “The MoPEP Machine.” All MoPEP member cities are now responsible for paying off any and all debts and obligations of MJMEUC/MoPEP because in the contract they signed blindly they agreed to pay all MoPEP’s “direct costs” of every kind “without limitation.” The “direct cost” pass-through and the “unlimited” nature of the pass-through debts was a key factor in the determination that their contracts may have made them “joint venture” customers with MJMEUC/MoPEP not just simple electric customers.
The $2.1+ BILLION in revenue bonds MJMEUC has issued as of this date have been used to purchase equity interests – ownership shares - in seven coal-fired power plants being built in the Midwest. In Missouri it is illegal for public bodies such as cities and school districts to make such equity investments, i.e. ownership positions usually in stocks or bonds. If they are, as the state auditor suggests, business partners in a joint venture then the MJMEUC investments are equally their investments and thus are all illegal. Given the results of this state audit, it may be belaboring the obvious when we point out once again that it is terminally stupid for elected officials to delegate to their utility department managers, people who typically have no education in high-risk finance and investing, the voting power to plunge their cities into over $2.1 BILLION in high-risk ‘deals’ that the cities know nothing about, do not understand and have no control over.

Many other MJMEUC members and members of its parent organization MPUA wisely avoided participation in the MoPEP scheme but to date 33 or 34 members have blundered into it without understanding what they were really getting into. That is why the MoPEP contract is said by some to have one other use - as a Darwinian test to identify the dumbest towns in Missouri.
State Auditor Montee explained in the Rolla audit why - contrary to what MoPEP officials and their advocates have claimed - these reckless equity investments in power plants are in fact direct liabilities of each MoPEP city member:

“Currently, RMU ‘Notes to the Financial Statements — Commitments and Contingencies,’ include general comments about MJMEUC and MoPEP with little or no detail about RMU ownership interest in power generating facilities under construction and/or to be constructed and the potential ownership costs. However, pursuant to Governmental Accounting Standards Board statements, it appears the relationship between the RMU and the MJMEUC/MoPEP may be a joint venture. Additionally, joint venture participants must disclose specific information including information regarding ongoing financial interest and/or financial responsibility and information to evaluate whether the joint venture is accumulating significant financial resources or causing a financial burden on the participating government in the future.” -State audit report No. 2009-4 (emphasis ed.)

Don’t be misled by the state auditor’s seemingly tentative use of “it appears” or “may be.” The State Auditor and the Attorney General’s office are not judicial bodies so they must give most of their opinions in the form of “may” or “might” especially when they are dealing with newly uncovered miscreants such as the MoPEP Ponzi Scheme, an investment swindle that hasn’t yet been taken apart in a court of law to expose and define its multiple illegal components. When either of these very focused and experienced groups of experts, the Attorney General or the State Auditor tells you that you “may” be breaking the law you should be very alarmed because their opinions, however tentatively expressed, are based upon decades of experience and well-researched facts. If six medical experts tell a man he has only weeks to live…the wise man plans a funeral, he doesn’t book a cruise.

The Auditor is said that Rolla citizens are being given “little or no detail about RMU ownership interest in power generating facilities under construction and/or to be constructed and the potential ownership costs.” If these coal-fired plants are such great investment deals why is information about the city’s financial involvement in MoPEP’s massive coal-fired investments being withheld from the citizens of Rolla and the people of other MoPEP member towns? MJMEUC CEO Duncan Kincheloe should be bragging to everyone about his great investment coup. Why is he so shy in sharing this information with his unwitting “joint venture” partners, the rubberstamping MoPEP committee who voted for all this debt?

The purpose of the full disclosure required of joint venture partners is so each joint venture partner can “evaluate whether the joint venture is accumulating significant financial resources or causing a financial burden on the participating government in the future.” Why do the MJMEUC board and CEO Kincheloe not want the 33 governments that signed their MoPEP contract to see and be able to “evaluate” whether these investments may be a “financial burden on the participating government in the future?”

The consequences of the Rolla Audit…

What is true of Rolla is equally true of all other MoPEP cities. To give a true picture of the liability of each city involved in the MoPEP “joint venture” other independent city auditors that perform annual city audits must now use the percentages of member participation in Exhibit M (must be updated annually as Kincheloe issues more revenue bonds to buy into more plants) of the MoPEP contract to calculate and report that city’s full MoPEP liability. The auditors of those cities that don’t include this liability information in their audits are doing a lousy job. One has to wonder why they do not warn their city clients of this shocking problem which will affect the city in the credit market.

The idea that a flimsy “shell corporation,” as Montee described MJMEUC/MoPEP, could, in so few years, gain control and manipulate so many towns in our state and load them up with billions in revenue bond debt without a single local vote or even the knowledge of the local taxpayers and voters is appalling. It tells us that the democratic safeguards and constitutional controls we have always taken for granted have had a massive systems failure and have left us naked to other predators. With one 32-page contract which lazy elected officials and city attorneys in one town after another didn’t bother to read or tried to read and couldn’t understand, voters in each of those towns were suddenly disenfranchised and denied the protection of the laws and constitutional provisions that have, prior to the MoPEP scheme, protected them from unfair and uncontrolled taxation. Raising utility rates beyond what is required to run the utility department and siphoning off the excess ‘profits’ to spend on other things is a hidden tax and a violation of the Hancock Amendment.

If the MoPEP method of “Governance by Contract” becomes the model for other multi-governmental projects — where municipal commitments for essential services are controlled by unread contracts that never end and which allow people who are ignorant of finance to exercise illegally delegated legislative powers that secretly burden us with billions in liabilities - then the financial viability of our communities will be suspect in every credit marketplace and our communities will be burdened with uncontrolled hidden taxes that will choke off all hope of economic development. If “Governance by Contract” spreads without challenge, local government - as a democratic organization accountable to the voters - is finished.

"We know Santa Claus is real; we caught him robbing our house"

Fitch Ratings scramble to revise rating criteria. Last week my Google news alerts started feeding me news stories about the crawfishing going on at Fitch Ratings as they scramble to redefine their rating criteria in a attempt to rescue their tattered reputation as a credit rating agency. The boys and girls at Fitch Ratings had gotten sloppy and much too cozy with the people they were rating. That’s why financially flimsy organizations like MJMEUC with no business experience, no reserves and no grown-up accounting system in a business that banks will not touch because they will soon be carbon-taxed out of existance, have gotten "A+" ratings based upon nothing more than some nice PR Kincheloe wrote up and mailed in.

Fitch also accepted at face value audits from an audit firm that couldn’t find its way to the CPA disciplinary committee with both hands. Williams Keepers, LLC, the audit firm MJMEUC hired to do their annual audits had said nothing to Fitch Ratings during the critical ratings review period about the “material weaknesses” and “significant deficiencies” in the consortium’s financial condition that they confessed this year were ongoing but which they had overlooked in all previous audits. Williams Keepers apparently only discovered this year, after Fitch Ratings had officially granted MJMEUC’s “A+” rating, that all Kincheloe’s investment organizations were using Quickbooks (for Dummies), that they had “lost” (as in: stolen, embezzled or fell behind the potted plant?) over $340,000, that their reserves were nearly non existent and that they had consistently omitted important information required by GAAP (the governmental accounting standards board) on Kincheloe’s $2 Billion in highly leveraged investments in coal-fired power plants. How convenient for MJMEUC.

Fitch to Revise Liquidity Assumptions for Covered Bond Ratings Fitch Ratings-London/Paris/Frankfurt-17 October 2008: Fitch Ratings is in the process of updating its qualitative and quantitative assessments of liquidity risks that covered bond investors are exposed to following an issuer default, in view of the ongoing liquidity crisis. It will publish its conclusions in a report during the fourth quarter of 2008.

Liquidity concerns affect covered bond ratings in two ways: on one hand, it may lead to a cap on the rating which the covered bonds may reach relative to the Issuer Default Rating (IDR), a relationship expressed through the Fitch Discontinuity Factor (D-Factor); and it impacts the level of over-collateralisation consistent with a certain rating scenario.

Fitch is conducting an intensive review of liquidity gap scores that form part of the D-Factor assigned to rated programmes. "We are re-assessing solutions used to overcome liquidity gaps that could arise after an issuer default," says Suzanne Albers, a Senior Director in Fitch Covered Bonds team in London. "The expected worse D-Factor will ultimately translate into a tighter relationship between the IDR of a financial institution and its covered bond rating."

At the same time, the agency is revising upwards its assumed refinancing costs and fire sale discounts, which are used to model the proceeds of asset sales should they be needed to repay covered bonds. "As a result, Fitch anticipates increased over-collateralisation being necessary to be in line with a given covered bond rating. The mismatches between a programme's asset and liability cash flows will determine the scale of the impact", says Dr. Holger Horn, a Senior Director in Fitch Covered Bonds team in Frankfurt.

Fitch Ratings confess in the standard disclaimer which can be seen on their site that (emphasis ed), “Ratings are based upon information obtained directly from issuers, other obligors, underwriters, their experts, and other sources Fitch Ratings believes to be reliable. Fitch Ratings does not audit or verify the truth or accuracy of such information, and has undertaken no obligation to so audit or verify such information or to perform any other kind of investigative diligence into the accuracy or completeness of such information. If any such information should turn out to contain misrepresentations or to be otherwise misleading, the rating associated with that information may not be appropriate and Fitch Ratings assumes no responsibility for this risk. The assignment of a rating to any issuer or any security should not be viewed as a guarantee of the accuracy, completeness, or timeliness of the information relied on in connection with the rating or the results obtained from the use of such information.”

Auditors have similar weasely disclaimers so between the two of them it is fair to conclude that financial ratings and hired audits are just so much expensive toilet paper. As some financial pundit recently put it, the whole structure of ratings, investing and financing that just collapsed was, “A financial mass delusion based on fictitious value of imaginary assets. It’s like finding out that Santa Claus is real because you caught him robbing your house.”

“We are re-assessing….gaps that could arise after an issuer default,” means, “We can’t afford to get caught with our panties down around our ankles as more companies we gave “A” ratings to go into the toilet." Fitch Ratings, Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s are all belatedly trying to repair the vast damage they’ve done in misleading investors into buying issues they rated with a generous rubber-stamp. The following articles about the Western Municipal Water District and M-S-R Public Power Agency's (M-S-R) $126.615 million, San Juan Project are the beginning of what will become a flood of similar refundings of bond issues to buy back the ARS – auction-rate securities - and other toxic derivatives that public entities and other gullible or greedy people have only recently realized they own. When you are forced to refund your bond issues, the same people who sold you the toxic waste (that you’re trying to buy back before your ARS counterparty interest rates kill you) will charge you the same outrageous rates and fees to repair the problem as they did when they conned you into this “good as cash” derivative scheme in the beginning. However their refunding fees come down dramatically if they’re threatened with a lawsuit for the fraud they committed during the initial funding. Notice that at least 60% the M-S-R "variable rate demand bonds "are being refunded with fixed rate bonds. (emph. ed)

Fitch Rates M-S-R Public Power Agency's (California) $127MM San Juan Proj Sub Lien...Tue Jun 17, 2008 6:26pm EDT Fitch Rates M-S-R Public Power Agency's (California) $127MM San Juan Proj Sub Lien Revs 'A+' SAN FRANCISCO--(Business Wire)—

Fitch Ratings has assigned a long-term 'A+' rating to M-S-R Public Power Agency's (M-S-R) $126.615 million, San Juan Project subordinate lien revenue bonds, series 2008L. In addition, Fitch has assigned an underlying 'A+' rating to M-S-R's $62.5 million Series 2008M, and$18.3 million Series 2008N bonds. The Series 2008M and 2008N bonds are variable rate demand bonds that are secured by a direct-pay letter of credit. The bonds are expected to receive structured ratings nearer to closing. The series 2008L bonds are fixed rate bonds. With the exception of approximately $10 million, the entire proceeds of the three series of bonds will be used to refund existing variable rate debt. All three series of bonds are secured by a net revenue pledge of the agency, subordinate to M-S-R's senior project revenue bonds. The Series 2008L bonds are scheduled to price on July 8th. The Series 2008M and 2008N bonds are scheduled to price on July 23rd.

Fitch also affirms the underlying 'A+' rating on the outstanding $73.65 million in senior lien San Juan project revenue bonds and the 'A+' rating on the outstanding $138.33 million of parity subordinate lien San Juan project revenue bonds. The Rating Outlook is Stable.

The ratings reflects the underlying credit quality of M-S-R's three members: The Modesto Irrigation District (rated 'A+' with a Stable Rating Outlook by Fitch), the City of Santa Clara dba Silicon Valley Power ('A'/Stable), and the City of Redding (rated 'A+'/Stable). Bondholders are supported by absolute and unconditional take-or-pay purchase power commitments with each of the members that extend for the life of the debt with a 25% step-up provision in the event of a member default. Payments by the members are made as an operating expense of their respective electric systems, ahead of each member's own direct debt payments. (more…)

Notice also the similarities to MJMEUC's collateral pledges in their investments in the M-S-R structure of unconditional “take-or-pay” contracts and “step-up” agreements. This is another “joint-agency” operation like MJMEUC but apparently without a MoPEP rat-trap contract. The coal power boys encouraged people like Kincheloe to organize these quasi-governmental entities to provide them with back-door financing when it became obvious the big banks were shutting the door on funding more of their dirty smokestack power. When high-dollar businesses like giant shopping malls and coal-fired power plants are too high-risk for big banks to finance, the practice now seems to be to find some greedy politicians to help you sucker the ignorant public into floating TIF bonds or "joint commission" revenue bonds so the unsuspecting public can become your high-risk bankers.

The problem with saving yourself from the frying pan by issuing another set of bonds to buy back your dirty auction-rate bonds is that many public entities that used the Missouri Development Finance Board (MDFB) to issue their bonds did so under the mistaken assumption that the financing costs and underwriter’s fees would be cheaper from a state agency. No one has ever proven that to be true. When desperate municipal refunders have to pay the same fees a second time to get their “rescue” bonds to cover the same money from their auction-rate derivative mistake, it sure as hell ain’t cheaper.

Most of MAMU clients still don’t know that their "lease-purchase" contracts for local utility projects that MAMU pimped to the MDFB were bonds converted to derivatives. The people who sucked them into this scam (that’s Kincheloe and MAMU) aren’t going to tell them how screwed they are now and risk bringing down on their heads a lawsuit for securities fraud. By the time everyone figures out they should have avoided MAMU and their unnecessary 1.5% middleman admin fee for 20 – 30 years and gone straight to MDFB to get plain old vanilla bonds, there will be such a rush to the exit that the refunding bond market will be glutted. A ‘buyers market’ means the seller pays dearly for his gullibility and bad market timing. Buyers of refunding bonds will also be able to cherry-pick the refunding offerings – that’s not to the seller’s advantage.

Has anybody seen our $18,000,000? This summer the non-reading “see-no-evil, hear-no-evil” members of the Rolla City Council handed over the authority to sign all the loan papers “after the blanks were filled in” to their appointed utility board for what they are still convinced (or prefer to believe) was a plain $18,000,000 “lease-purchase” contract with MAMU. It wasn’t of course, it was more of the same trash that had already glutted the ARS market and caused it to collapse in February. The Rolla Utility Board immediately started pouring concrete for their big project. We don’t know exactly what their project is really all about because they claimed the Patriot Act and National Security prevents them from disclosing the details of this massive public debt to the ratepayers. Their little engineering report might give aid and comfort to the terrorists they’re convinced are lurking behind the Quick Mart. Unfortunately, the pile of papers that constitute their signed and sealed $18,000,000 MAMU-MDFB utility bond lease-purchase derivative auction-rate securities loan is still sitting unfunded on the desk of some MDFB employee because the auction-rate securities market shut down in February, their Wachovia underwriters have gone belly-up and the entire credit market collapsed this month. Could more things have gone wrong with one project?

Their check is not exactly in the mail but RMU has started the project using their reserves anyway. Their $18M signed credit card – the equivalent of Bearer Bonds - is sitting on someone’s desk in Jefferson City for anyone to use and they’re not a bit concerned.

The M-S-R San Juan article mentioned that “The delivered cost of the project to members was higher than usual at $80 per megawatt hour (MWh) due to the outages and the relatively high proportion of fixed costs (50% or $42 per MWh). The delivered cost to members is projected to range between $60-70 MWh in the next few years.” One of Kincheloe’s tactics is to always quote the $42 or $45 cost of power as produced by the new plants instead of the “delivered cost.” Delivered costs are the cost the customer pays for getting the Powder River coal delivered to the plant, the cost of producing the power and the cost of delivery of the electricity. Coal is relatively cheap…or it was until recently…but the cost of transporting it by rail to the plant is prohibitive. The costs in the M-S-R rating story are closer to the truth than Kincheloe’s vague “stable prices.” They will be stable at a much higher price than his MoPEP members think.

In the full M-S-R refunding article, Fitch Ratings for the first time admits “… long-term concerns exist related to the state's greenhouse gas legislation that may make it less advantageous to own carbon producing resources, such as San Juan.”

A shattering possibility… While it is well-documented that MAMU pool loans done for various small town utility projects were abused by converting safe and secure low-rate, long-term, revenue bonds into short-term, high-risk, variable-rate auction-rate derivatives, it wasn’t until reading about the M-S-R project and their similarities to MJMEUC that this horrible possibility came up. Did MJMEUC-MoPEP also use the $2 Billion in revenue bonds that they issued to invest in the seven power plants as derivative gambling instruments in the market that has just crashed and burned? In the case of M-S-R they obviously were doing exactly that.

The M-S-R rating review disclosed that, “The debt restructuring being implemented through the three bond series will leave M-S-R with only 18% of its debt portfolio in synthetic fixed-rate mode. (A “synthetic fixed-rate mode” is the initial fixed-rate that after only a short time coverts to a variable interest rate which is established by a 7-49 day auction.) The result of the restructuring will be a more traditional debt portfolio, with reduced counterparty risk.” The mention of “counterparty risk” is the tip off that this was an ARS because there is no “counterparty” and no “risk” in a regular revenue bond issue. We fear that Kincheloe also used his MJMEUC revenue bonds as derivatives in the now defunct auction-rate gambling market. If he did, the MoPEP sharecroppers are in a lot more trouble than even they know.

Another refunding because of auction-rate securities. (emph. ed)

Fitch Rates Western Municipal Water District (California) BANs 'F1+' Thursday October 16, 7:02 pm ET SAN FRANCISCO--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Fitch rates the Western Municipal Water District of Riverside County, California's 2008 Refunding Bond Anticipation Notes (BANs) 'F1+'. The note proceeds will refund the Series 2002 Adjustable Rate revenue bonds, currently outstanding as auction rate securities. The notes are secured by a net revenue pledge of the district's water and wastewater systems. The notes are expected to have a maturity date of less than one year. The notes are scheduled to price the week of October 27th, depending on market conditions.
The 'F1+' rating reflects the district's strong credit fundamentals, healthy unrestricted cash levels as compared to Fitch medians, and Fitch's expectation that the district will be able to access the bond market to refinance the bonds with long-term debt at maturity. (more…)

This water district probably doesn’t use Quicken for Dummies either. Refunding is full of expensive traps. If your community is smart enough to recognize their mistake in using any of MAMU and MDFB’s loan products, better get out now…the rest, like Rolla, will live in denial and get trampled in the stampede for the Exit when someone finally yells “Fire!”